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RESTRICTED 
THE MUNITIONS BOARD AND NATIONAL STRATEGY 
A lecture delivered by 
Rear Admiral Morton L. Ring, USN 
at the Naval War College 
on May 11, 1950 
I would like to discuss this morning the work of the Muni­
tions, Board and tell you something about the industrial plans be­
ing developed and the measures which are being carried out to sup­
port current and future military operations. 
You will note that I use the word support. This word key­
notes the role of the Munitions Board in its relation to national 
strategy. 
If military men have any distinguishing specialty which sets 
them apart from their civilian brothers, it is their proclivity for 
teamwork and organization. It is a natural tendency because it 
is based on the knowledge that teamwork is essential. For a team 
to function effectively it must be well organized. 
And so, for centuries, when military men have been given a 
,iob to accomplish, they immediately have turned their thoughts to 
how to organize to do it. 
Now whether the elements of a military organization are 
identified as Bureaus, or G-ls, G-2s, G-3s, or G-4s or directorates 
of training, intelligence, operations, etc., we nevertheless recognize 
Rear Admiral Ring is Director for Military· Supply, Munitions 
Board. A Supply Corps Officer, he has · held the position of Vice. 
Chief of the Material Division, Office of the Secretary of the Navy. 
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the need for some men to concentrate on personnel matters, others 
to concentrate on intelligence, others .on operations (strategy and 
tactics), and still others on logistics. Of these, three play a support­
ing role to the fourth. Intelligence, personnel and logistics all owe 
their existence to the necessity for supporting the people engaged 
in operations. 
Of these supporting elements that I have mentioned, there 
is one which most accurately describes the area in which the Muni­
tions Board specializes. This is the area of logistics. 
In its broad sense, logistics embraces all activities necessary 
to build, support and maintain fighting forces. It is the broad ef­
fort based upon the productive capacity and manpower of a nation. 
It extends through successive phases of planning and through the 
procurement and distribution of manpower and material to theatres 
of military operations. It is a process by which the raw war-ma�ing 
potential of a nation is translated into military forces that are em­
ployed against the enemy in pursuit of strategic and tactical ob­
jectives. 
At the top-most level the logistician must bridge the gap 
between two activities, one of which is almost fully military and the 
other civilian and economic. He has a twofold responsibility. The 
logistician is required to make military requirements intelligible to 
industry so that it can produce equil)ment and supplies
'. 
He also 
has to see that the logistic capabilities, including the nation's 
economic capabilities, are reflected in strategic and tactical cal­
culations. 
He must act as the link between the war front and the home 
front, for the logistic process is at one and the same time the 
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military element in the nation's economy and the economic element 
in its military operations. 
In World War II, more than ever before in military history, 
operations were conditioned by "weight of materiel." By "weight of 
materiel" is meant all supplies and equipment used by, or useful 
to, the armed forces in adequate quantities to permit them to ac­
complish effectively their mission of national security. The ability 
to mass materiel rather than men in a given area became, in gen­
eral, the governing factor in preparing for an offensive. 
Circumstances which I need not detail here gave us the 
time needed to prepare this materiel. It seems quite evident from 
.the record that the organizing of our logistic support for World War 
II was for a long time inadequate to support major offensive opera­
tions and was enormously wasteful. 
Our victory in World War II was the result of a number of 
factors. We had fighting men of great courage and ability. We 
had friends on the battlefronts who held the line until we could 
prepare and join them. We had enemies who made some grave mis­
takes. We had superb military and civilian leadership. We were 
convinced that right was on our side, and we entertained no 
thought of losing. 
But our greatest advantage, and it proved to be sufficient 
to swing victory to our side, was American industry and its ability 
to mass-produce the goods of war in a volume that almost defies 
comprehension. 
Just by way of reminder, I might say that in addition to 
millions of other items, large and small, we turned out during the 
war nearly 300,000 airplanes, 87,000 tanks, 80,000 landing craft, 
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17 million rifles, 21/; million trucks, and 4½ million tons of artillery 
shells. 
This was the unforeseeable factor that lost the war for the 
Axis. They had not dreamed-nobody had ever dreamed-that 
such a mighty arsenal could be developed so fast. When our Presi­
dent, shortly after we were attacked, announced America's inten­
tion to produce immediately these vast quantities of munitions and 
other machinery of war, the laughs and jeers of German leaders 
rang·throughout the world. They had good reason to laugh. They 
were industrial experts and they had spent many years building up 
their war machine. 
And they were very nearly. proved right. Some of the dark­
est days in the history of this country followed Pearl Harbor. 
What armed forces we had were meagerly armed and equipped. 
Our troops went bravely into the first bitter campaigns with far 
less in the way of modern arms and equipment than we knew they 
should have. Better things were on the way; they just weren't 
ready yet; and the war couldn't wait for them. 
We came closer than many people realize to losing the war 
because we were late-perilously late-in converting our industry 
to wa:r production. Donald Nelson, the Chairman of the War. Pro­
duction Board, expressed the considered opinion that we would 
have been beaten before we got started had our country bordered 
on Germany. It would have been the greatest irony in history had 
this catastrophe befallen a nation whose potential strength and 
industrial output, when finally geared to the production of war 
goods, exceeded by far any similar effort in the history of man. 
But we succeeded with tremendous effort and at staggering 
cost. In the desperate and convulsive adjustments to an all-out 
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wartime economy, we learned bitter lessons, which we filed for 
future reference. Nobody involved in that effort can ever forget 
the costly and frightening difficulties, and nobody could recommend 
that we attempt such a job again under similar circumstances • 
. The unhappy fact is that we can never again expect to have 
the breaks we had in World War II. Our salvation then was time 
-two years of general preparation before we were attacked, and
another year of protection by our Allies after we were attacked,
before we began to throw our full weight into the fight. But we
will never have all of those advantages again. And this means
that we must ourselves maintain such a military posture-and
help our friends to maintain such a military posture-that any ag­
gressor would be discouraged from attacking us or any of our
friends.
In July of 1947 the President signed the National Secur­
ity Act whicli created a national security team. It provided for a 
systematic organization of civilian and military mobilization plan­
ning. This "Unification Act", as it is sometimes called, brought 
our entire military force under a single cabinet member, the Secre­
tary of Defense. It unified military planning in the field of indus­
trial mobilization. In August of last year Congress made certain 
changes in the Act, particularly giving the Secretary of Defense 
authority, direction and control over the military departments and 
other agencies of the Department of Defense. 
This National Security Organization consists of three levels 
or echelons: the non-military agencies reporting to the President; 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense ; and the Departments of 
the Army, Navy, and Air Force.· 
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The non-military agencies are: (1) The National Security 
Council which advises the President with respect to the integrat­
ion of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national 
security, and (2) the National Security Resources Board which ad­
vises the President with respect to the coordination and integration 
of civilian, industrial and military mobilzation plans. 
Within the Department of Defense, the Act and its amend­
ments created four staff agencies to the Secretary of Defense-­
the Armed Forces Policy Council, to advise the Secretary of Defense 
on top policy; the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop strategic plans; 
the Research and Development Board to coordinate scientific re­
search for military purposes; and the Munitions Board, which is 
the industrial mobilization and logistics planning arm of the De­
partment of Defense. 
The operating echelon of the national security team con­
sists of the Departments of Army, Navy, and Air Force. 
At this point I would like to cover briefly the relationship 
which exists between the Munitions Board and the various other 
'arms' of the national security team. 
Of the organizations which I have just described, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, the Munitions Board, the Logistics Groups of the 
three Departments, and the National Security Resources Board are 
agencies most intimately involved in logistic planning and coordi­
nation. 
It must be emphasized that the National Security Resources 
Board engages in planning for all requirements and coordinates 
over-all planning for military, industrial and civilian mobilization. 
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The Munitions Board on the other hand supervises the de­
velopment _of military requirements which include end items, to-:­
gether with the manpower facilities and transportation required 
in the production of finished munitions. 
Another way of stating this division of responsibility is to 
point out that the National Security Resources Board does for the 
nation as a whole what the Munitions Board does for the Depart­
ment of Defense in the economic and industrial mobilization fields . 
. The National Security Resources Board is concerned with two 
'major jobs: (1) national mobilization planning and (2) measures 
to be taken during peacetime to keep our resources in readiness 
for mobilization. 
Mobilization planning, from the National Security Resources 
.· Board point of view, involves identification of problems which will 
arise if the nation must move from a peacetime to a wartime situ-
• ation, and the development of measures necessary to resolve these
. problems. It requires consideration and development of all measures
to mobilize effectively the Nation's human, natural, productive, 
and financial resources to meet wartime needs. 
A specific example of how this relationship between the 
National Security Resources Board, or a similar wartime control 
agency, and the Munitions Board would operate in wartime may 
be in order. The National Security Resources Board makes broad 
allocations of materials and manpower to the Department of De­
fense and to other claimant agencies as well. The Munitions 
Board makes allocations of facilities· and materials among the 
Army, Navy and Air Force and establishes priorities and sched­
ules governing their procurement programs. Matters pertaining 
to price control, rationing, wage stabilization, monetary policy, 
and over-all utilization of small business fall within the purview 
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of the National Security '.Resources Board or some other agency 
such as an Office of War Mobilization.· 
Another example may be useful to you. The Munitions Board 
is interested in the petroleum products, the iron ore, and the tin 
av;ailable for military programs and· makes allocations of these 
materials among the Army, Navy and Air Force. The National 
Security Resources Board necessarily makes plans involving the 
same materials but it concerns itself with the allocation of the 
Nation's total supplies among several claimant agencies of which 
one claimant is the Department of Defense. 
The second major job of the National Security Resources 
Board concerns current policies and programs, or peacetime pol­
icies and programs, through which the nation may achieve an 
adequate state of readiness against the eventuality of a future war. 
The policies and programs deal with such matters as stockpiling of 
strategic and critical materials, training of skilled manpower, and 
the wide range of other measures being undertaken currently to 
keep industry and the armed forces continually prepared to meet 
the needs of a possible wartime situation. The Munitions Board 
looks to the National Security Resources Board for broad policy 
guidance on preparedness programs in order to coordinate fully 
the military preparedness measures. To this end, the Munitions 
Board interests itself not only in, the military requirements for 
strategic and critical materials, and skilled manpower, but all 
conceivable dli!vices which will facilitate and speed-up tlie transi­
tion from peacetime to wartime conditions. Some of these devices 
which will be discussed in detail later are: assembling of :mobili'­
zation requirements of the Armed Forces; production planning 
with industry; developing a standard cataloging and specification 
system; and establishment of uniform procurement regulations. 
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The Joint Chiefs of Staff are charged with the preparation 
of strategic and logistical plans for the direction of the military 
·forces. All actions of the Munitions Board are in support of these
plans. The requirements which we use to make production plans
are those computed by the departments based on Joint Chiefs of
Staff plans and given the seal of approval by the Joint Chiefs.
In its simplest terms, the Joint Chiefs of Staff tell us what will
be needed for mobilization and the Munitions Board prepares the
industrial plans to fulfill these needs. We advise the Joint Chiefs
of Staff on the logistic and industrial feasibility of their strategic
plans and they determine what adjustments will be made in these
plans in order that industry can adequately support military needs.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff. advise us of the priority in which equip­
ment and supplies will be needed and we make production plans in
accordance with" those priorities.
When the National Security Act was passed, it contained 
no clearly defined. line in the logistic field. However, on the basis 
of experience in the last two years, we have worked out an under� 
standing with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Munitions Board haEt 
responsibility for what we call "producer logistics" and the econ­
omy or business aspects of "consumer logistics." The remainder 
of the logistic field, which we call the command aspects of con­
sumer logistics, is the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
In order to clarify the use · of these terms,. "producer logis­
tics" is defined as all logistic activities up to the time that a mili­
tary end item enters· our military distribution system. From that 
point on, the field is called "consumer logistics." 
The Research and Development·Board has the responsibility 
of advising the Munitions Board, as early as possible, of any new 
developments, both in the way of new materials and end items which 
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may require new production processes and schedules. The Munitions 
- Board, in turn, must convert these new developments into adjust­
ed requirements and production plans.
Within the Department of Defense, the Army, Navy, and Air 
Force are the operating agencies in industrial matters. Their 
representatives not only participate in planning for industrial 
mobilization but they then convert planning into actions. The 
viewpoints andconsiderations of the staff and operating agencies 
of the departments bear on the formulation of Munitions Board 
programs. It is through the military departments that the Muni­
tions Board programs are carried to successful conclusions. 
So far, I have just made general statements regarding the 
Organization for National Security and the relationship which the 
Munitions Board has to other branches of this organization. Before 
we proceed to more detailed remarks concerning the Munitions 
Board's program and fields of operation, I would like to give you 
a brief sketch of its organization. 
The Board itself consists of a civilian chairman, Mr. Hubert 
E. Howard, and one member each from the three departments. At
present, the Munitions Board members are Mr. Eugene M. Zuckert,
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force; Mr. John T. Koehler, As­
sistant Secretary of the Navy; and Mr. Archibald S. Alexander,
Assistant Secretary of the Army.
The· Chairman of the Board directs and supervises our staff 
through the Director of the Staff. The Director of the Staff is 
assisted by three staff directors; one for Industrial Programs, one 
for Milit3:ry Programs, and one for Military Supply. Both the 
Chairman and the Director of the Staff are assisted by Advisors in 
such fields as economics, law and legislation, and public information. 
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The Director for Industrial Programs is concerned with 
production planning, the acquisition of strategic and critical ma­
terials, the maintenance of reserves of industrial plants and equip­
ment, materials, construction, and manpower. This group looks .. 
toward industry. 
The Director for Military Supply concerns himself with the 
assignment of purchase responsibility, development of procurement 
regulations, standardization, cataloging, and small-business aspects. 
In the field of supply management, he concerns himself with such 
matters as material control, material handling, maintenance and 
salvage, transportation, traffic management, and communications. 
This directorate looks down into the business functions of the de­
partments. 
The third director, the Director for Military Programs, con­
cerns himself with �he coordination of mobilization requirements 
and with international programs, which include foreign military 
aid, export controls, and planning for economic warfare. This di­
rectorate also handles all internal planning, coordinates variou'-3 
programs of the Munitions Board, works out our relationships with 
other military agencies and departments of the Government, and 
· supervises budget matters in the field of industrial mobilization
planning. This group deals with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
planners in the departments.
You will note that our organization is on a functional basis. 
There is one exception to the organizational structure: Three com� 
modity divisions have been created as focal points for coordinating 
end items that are considered critical enough to the armed forces to 
require treatment on a commodity basis. These are the Divisions 
for Aircraft, Petroleum, and Electronics. 
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The Munitions Board is a staff organization of the Depart­
ment of Defense dealing in policy and it has certain statutoI,"Y func­
tions from which its plans and programs are derived.· llowever, 
a simple way to remember the Munitions Board plans and pro­
grams that will be necessary in case of an emergency is to tp.ink 
of what activities would be required to ptoduce an end item such 
as a submarine, or an airplane, or a tank. First of all, we must 
know the number of the item that will be required; and this will 
include such things as initial issue, stock levels, replacement 
quantities, and pipeline requirements. Production facilities are 
needed, so we have a production allocation program. Machine tools 
are needed, manpower is needed, electric power, water, housing 
for labor, transportation, and raw materials to make the item. 
Security plans are required to protect the activities. All of these 
should indicate the nature of the programs that must be prepared 
and adjµsted by the Munitions Board in consonance with the 
strategic plans and the civilian economy. 
One of the primary requisites for assuring industrial pre­
paredness is informing industry of what it will be expected to 
manufacture in an emergency. Before this information can be. 
furnished in sufficient completeness and accuracy, a fundamental 
step must be accomplished. This is to find out what and how 
much the Army, Navy, and Air Force will need in time ·of war. 
This is not the "what" and "how much" of material alone; it must 
include all the material and personnel in the right place at the 
right time. These needs are called "requirements." Specific data, 
collected in peacetime on wartime requirements, when added to 
similar data for civilian wartime needs, are the foundation upon 
which can be built the military, industrial, civilian, and national 
economic mobilization planning for the support of a war effort.· 
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Our Requirements Program is the end product of our stra­
tegic planning cycle. This cycle begins with a JCS strategic plan 
which outlines forces and missions for the Army, Navy and Air 
Force. The military departments in turn translate the missions 
assigned in the strategic concept into operational plans, adding the 
necessary supporting and service troops. Then they have to figure 
what these troops will need and the times and places they will 
need them. If a particular plane is more important to our cam­
paign plans for a certain area than a particular tank is in another 
area, then we can translate this fact into industrial programs to­
gether with the order of precedence they must assume. Not only 
for the manufacture of the plane itself, but for procuring the fuel 
,�o run it, the ammunition it will use, the clothes and equipment its 
crew will need, the ground equipment necessary to service the 
plane in its combat area, the transportation to take the main­
tenance personnel and equipment to the area. 
I will list the thirteen categories of requirements that are 
I 
considered in industrial mobilizaton planning: Manpower; ma-
terials; components; construction; equJpment and supplies; com­
munication facilities; transportation service; petroleum products; 
water supply; production equipment; electric power; gas; and coal 
and coke. 
The calculation of requirements in sufficient detail to be use­
ful is an intricate and time-consuming proce�s. Where military 
decision and judgment are necessary, these calculations must be 
made carefully and deliberately. Where the work involved is more 
clerical in nature, requiring the translation of specific troop units 
into end-item requirements, the work may be expedited by the use 
of mechanical and electrical calculating syst�ms. The procedures 
to be followed by the Army, Navy, and Air Force in compiling and 
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presenting their mobilization requirements are prescribed in the 
"Requirements Manual", a publication of the Munitions Board. 
In order that we may be reasonably certain that the opera­
tional plans can be supported by American Industry, prior to the 
detailed caJculation of many thousands of items, we conduct what 
we call a 'feasibility test'. Since we can't take all of the items, 
we select some 300 important end Items, such as particular types 
of planes, naval vessels, tanks, trucks, and electronics; steel, cop­
per, aluminum, petroleum, construction, and merchant shipping. 
If the strategic plan appears infeasible from an industrial point of 
view the JCS will either modify the plan to bring it within the 
capability of American industry, or the JCS will elect to take 
calculated risks as to short supplies of ·various needed items. De­
pendent upon the answer given by the JCS, the military depart­
ments proceed with the detailed computation of requirements, with 
a reasonable assurance as to the degree to which they can be pro­
duced by industry in the event of war. 
The Munitions Board consolidates and reviews the total re­
quirements as they are prepared by the three departments and ar­
ranges for necessary adjustments. When completed, the consoli­
dated mobilization requirements are presented to the Secretary of 
Defense with recommendations for their adoption. The Munitions 
Board presents and defends these requirements before the National 
Security Resources Board, and then acts as a claimant agency for 
the Department of Defense in the allocation of all national resources. 
The Requirements Program provides the information neces­
sary for the operation of all other industrial mobilization programs. 
It becomes, therefore, the central or key problem requiring solution. 
Once the requirements of the three departments have been 
established, it is obvious that the next step is to determine where
so RESTRICTED 
14
Naval War College Review, Vol. 3 [1950], No. 6, Art. 3
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol3/iss6/3
RESTRICTED 
and how these needs can be fulfilled. No single program of the 
Munitions Board will provide the answer to the where and how but 
rather -a series of inter-related programs and plans are necessary. 
In World War II we found that a strong industrial economy 
that can make automobiles, refrigerators, and other consumer items 
cannot be converted over night into making weapons and supplies 
needed by the military services. We also found that it takes many 
months to produce a satisfactory finished product from a newly 
constructed plant. Such a period of grace cannot be expected if 
we become involved in another conflict. We need stand-by plants 
which can be converted quickly irito war production. Our Plant 
Reserve Program, which follows Public Laws 364 and 883, author­
izes the military departments to maintain plants owned or con­
trolled by the Army, Navy, and Air Force. These plants are main- � 
tained in stand-by condition so as to be .available for production of 
military supplies in an emergency. In addition, military and other 
· . Federally owned plants that are surplus to our current needs, can
be sold or leased with a "national security clause." Under this
clause, the Government retains an interest in the plant which re­
quires the buyer or lessee to maintain the plant in such condition
that it can be converted to war production within 120 days. Sur­
plus plants for which we cannot find a prospective buyer or lessee
are in the hands of the General Services Administration. It holds
them. in reserve as custodian.
Considered as a whole, these various reserve plants, to­
gether with the plants that have been sold but which still make 
their original .product or a similar product, amount to over 900 of 
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Reserve plants are obviously inadequate to meet the military 
requirements in event of an emergency. To fill the,gap, there is a 
program for pre-planning with industry for the manufacture of 
essential items of material. This is known as the Production Al- . 
location Program. 
The over-all objective of this program is to develop plans, 
- . · . ·  ' (' 
in· consultation with industrial management, that will enable a 
quicker change-over to war . production should the need ari.se. 
Specifically, the objective is to: 
(1) Locate now the manufacturing capacity that will be re­
quired for wartime production of essential supplies and equip­
ment, and 
(2) Develop specific and realistic production schedules that can
be converted into production contracts in time of mobilization. 
It should be not.ed here that Industry's participation in 
the Production Allocation Program, while vital to its success, is 
entirely voluntary. No production preparedness plans requiring 
the participation of management will be effected without manage­
ment's consent and cooperation. 
When you think of this task in terms of the thousands of 
items required to make war, and the thousands of plants needed 
to make these items, the job seems almost impossible. 
The wartime requirements for articles of a military nature 
(the production of which in peacetime is generally confined to a 
few Government arsenals on little or more than a pilot line basis) 
presents the problem of. industrial conversion. This change of ex­
isting industrial facilities to the production of military items is 
one of the first and most pressing necessities of industrial mobiliza­
tion. The problem is not only one of conversion, but of rapid con-
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· versicm. The Industry Preparedness Measures Program is in­
tended to shorten the time between awarding of contracts and
reaching the highest possible wartime production rates for such
items by means of production studies in peacetime.
As a general rule, the items considered for study have no 
commercial counterpart. Exploratory studies are made by indus­
try in order to discover what bottlenecks might develop in war­
time, and recommendations are made to the departments on the 
best way to remove them. Then, if appropriate, additional con­
tracts are let based on the early studies. These might involve 
plant layouts, planning for important components, actual tools 
might be purchased, and in some cases, small quantities of the item 
are manufactured in order to test the tools and to train and main­
tain the know-how of the working force. 
In the discussion of the Reserve Plant Program, it was 
. pointed out that the intent of the program is to preserve the in­
dustrial potential of our reserve plants for possible future military 
production. In like manner we must provide for reserves of pro­
uction equipment, such as machine tools, handling and processing 
equipment, etc. For this purpose we have established the Indus­
trial Production Equipment Program. These reserves are in add­
ition to the items of production equipment that are part of the 
plants held in the Plant Reserve Program. Most of the equipment 
was supplied from postwar surplus inventories under a program 
operated jointly by the three military departments. Maintenance 
of the reserves and the inspection, acquisition, and allocation of the 
relatively small number of surplus items still available are now 
coordinated by the Munitions Board. On 1 April 1950, there were 
approximately 100,000 items in the military reserve and 15,000 in 
the national reserve. Then some 59,000 other items are in actual 
use by the military departments or by their contractors. 
RESTRICTED 33 
17
Ring: The Munitions Board and National Strategy
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1950
RESTRICTED 
I have discussed two important factors in production-in­
dustrial plants and equipment. A third factor is production ma­
terials. One of the most important programs to the Nation is the 
stockpiling of strategic and critical materials that will not be 
available in sufficient quantities in time of war. Our Stockpiling 
Program is a national program, not just a military. one. The 
Munitions Board acts as central staff agency for the entire program 
and coordinates the activities of other government agencies that 
can assist in the stockpiling effort. The actual purchasing is done 
by the Federal Supply Service of the General Service Adminis­
tration. 
On the basis of materials surveys made by the Munitions 
Board, 71 materials have been chosen for the stockpile. Of these, 
52 are minerals. Only 8 are produced in this country to any great 
extent, and only 27"are produced in this country at all. This stock­
pile, when completely filled, will cost approximately 4 billion dol­
lars at present prices. We hope to have about 50 percent of the 
materials actually in the stockpile by the end of this fiscal year. 
I mentioned to you earlier that, · although the Munitions 
Board is organized on a functional basis, it does give special at­
tention, on a commodity basis, to three types of requirements. 
These are aircraft, petroleum and electronic equipment. The reasons 
for selecting these commodities for individual treatment are: 
(1) The special military importance attached to the end items
involved in these three programs. 
(2) The integrated nature of the industries involved.
(3) A recognition of the high priority which these commodities
will have in drawing upon the Nation's resources. 
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( 4) The fact that because all three military departments are
so deeply concerned with the use of these commodities that it is 
not feasible to assign procurement responsibility to any one de­
partment. 
I have discussed with you the most important of the Muni­
tions Board Program which will reach full implementation only 
in time of war. There are other activities of the Board which are 
aimed primarily toward increasing the efficiency of the Depart­
ment of Defense--those activities which will produce economy in 
men, money, and time. These programs might be called our war­
preparedness program, or supply management . 
. 
The concept of a supply system was well expressed by the 
Hoover Commission report. It stated that the following primary 
. phases must be included in the word supply: 
1. Specifications, or the task of establishing standards for
the property to be purchased.
2. Purchasing, or the acquisition of property.
3. Traffic Management, or the transporting of property from
the point of purchase or storage to the point of need.
4. Inspection, or insuring adherence of property to purchase
specifications.
5. Property identification, or the task of cataloging .prop­
erty under a standard system so. as to facilitate identi­
fication.
6. Storage and issue, or the storing of necessary reserves of
property and their distributio:q when needed.
7. Property utilization, or the task of seeing that property
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is efficiently used, adequately maintained and suitably dis­
posed of when no longer needed. 
To any one of the seven primary phases of supply this 
speaker could well devote his whole effort. Suffice it to say that 
the Munitions Board is devoting extensive effort to each of these 
elements of our "readiness for war" program. We are convinced 
that sound supply management policies will assist in extracting 
the utmost return from the dollars now budgeted for this pur­
pose. We feel very strongly that we can no longer plan for a war 
where we will have inexhaustible resources of men, money. and 
materials. We may at any time pass from the status of a "have 
nation" to that of a "have-not nation" and we must plan accordingly. 
Thus far, I have discussed the major steps which the De­
partment of Defense, operating through the Munitions Board, is 
taking to increase the industrial mobilization potential of the 
United States. 
Now let me turn for a few moments to current interna­
tional affairs. In this respect, I wish to discuss, in very broad 
terms, the industrial capabilities for war of the North Atlantic 
Treaty nations. Plans have not yet progressed sufficiently be­
tween the United States and the various allied foreign governments 
to determine their combined industrial capabilities for war. The 
Munitions Board, however, does have responsibilities in con­
nection with the Military Production and Supply Board of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. I will briefly outline the 
Organization and then discuss the functions and planning now 
being carried on by the Military Production and Supply Board. 
The North Atlantic Treaty provides for a collective se­
curity arrangement among nations of the North Atlantic area. The 
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·Treaty is a 20 year agreement for the purpose . of. common de­
fense.
The top organization is the Council, which is composed of 
,the foreign ministers of the signatory countries. The U. S. mem..: 
her is ·the Secretary of State; Mr. Acheson. The Council has the 
broad responsibility for implementing the Treaty. 
Under the Council is the Defense Committee, the U. S. 
member being the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Johnson. This com­
�mittee has the responsibility for developing and maintaining the 
·"'-, individual and collective capacity of the member countries to
resist aggression. 
The Military Committee represents the military side of 
the Organization, General Bradley being the U. S. member. This 
Committee is comparable to a combined Chiefs of Staff organiza­
tion. It is charged with the formulation of strategic and logistic 
plans for the defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area. 
The Standing Group is the day-to-day working organization, 
and is located in the Pentagon Building. Five regional planning 
groups have been established, which cover different areas·· of the 
North Atlantic. 
The Military Production and Supply Board is the supply 
side of the organization. It might be said that the Military Pro­
duction _and Supply Board bears the same relationship, in a gen­
eral way, to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as the Muni­
tions Board does to the Department of Defense. The U. S. mem­
ber is Mr. Howard, who is also "the chairman of · the Munitions 
Board. The day-to-day operations are performed by the Permanent 
Working Staff, which is located in London. 
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The Munitions Board is charged by the Secretary of De­
fense -vJit'.h the :dev�lopmenl of guidance for the U. 'S. member 'of:
the ''.Military Production ahd <supply 'Board and the· tr. s. repre­
sentative to the Pe�ma.nen:t Workirig ·Staff. The Murtitions Bo��d 
iEf also responsible for' for�ufating, in coordination with �hJ �p­
propriate executive departments and agencies, the tr� s� poJiti�n 
on matters brought before the Military Production and Supply 
B9ard.: 
The initial: responsibilities of. the Board are: 
' . (1) ·To d�velop ways and means of meeting material deficiencies 
needed in support of strategic plans. 
(2) To promote more efficient methods of production of mili­
tary. equipme11t.
(3) To promote standardization of military equipment.
In brief; then, the Military Production and Supply. Board
is: an internationaJ agency. having the responsibility for developing 
ways arid means for meeting . .the material deficiencies needed to 
support North Atlantic Treaty strategic plans; for integrating 
the production of milit.ary items by European signatories ; and for 
the promotion of standardization. 
The Military Production and Supply Board. is still in its 
infancy and progress has necessarily been slow. The second meet­
in'g of the Boa�d was held at The. Hague on March 29th of this year. 
Working on a twelve-nation basis under Mr. Howard's 
chairmanship, the Board has accomplished all of the preliminary 
work necessary to embark on a coordinated military production 
program with the Treaty countries. A review has been made of 
the major deficiencies in military equipment for the support of the 
North Atlantic Defense Plan, together with a survey of production 
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. .' . ·' . ,  • . i '  
.. 
bythe Unit�d States for additional military production .in Europe 




- · , ,. . . . ' '  ' 
The tempo of military production in Europe is stepping up, ,now. 
, and will continue to do so. 
A review of military equipment in Europe surplus to each 
country's needs has also been made. In some cases transfers of 
this equipment have been effected and transf�rs for ,the balance 
, are being arranged. As you know a large part of Military Aid 




Plans have been made and, in some �ses, production al­
ready started in Europe to supply spare parts for U; S. equipment. 
The Military Production and Supply Board has been di­
rected by the Defense Committee to promote standardization of 
equipment wherever possible. This means that the Board will ad­
vise regarding production of equipment selected by the Military 
side of the organization. Standardization, wherever possible, is a 
most important adjunct of the North Atlantic Military Production 
plan. 
I have covered our major programs. I believe you are now 
well aware of the fact that all our work in the Munitions Board 
has a distinctly industrial flavor. We recognize that the coopera­
tion, advice, and direct participation of industry are essential to 
our work. Our plans must be workable. To insure that industry . 
will want to adopt our plans, it must participate in the,ir prepara­
tion. Industry has participated directly in our programs that have 
involved the surveying of productive capacity, the scheduling of 
wartime production in individual plants, and carrying on engi� ·.· 
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neering studies to improve our state of preparedness. Six hun;_ 
dred industrialists from all segments of industry serve on various 
committees and sub-:eommittees and advise the Board and the 
Board's staff on important problems. 
Our objective is to prepare industrial plans that will give 
America maximum security without militarizing our Nation or 
bankrupting our economy. Each procedure we adopt and every 
plan we develop are designed to buy time and to make it possible 
for us to mobilize our industrial potential rapidly and effectively in 
time of war. The participation of industry in the early stages of 
our planning will insure industry's understanding and cooperation 
in the event of an emergency. 
Gentlemen, from my outline, I am sure you realize the scope 
and importance of our problems. I am sure, as well, that you must 
realize that the task is far from complete. May I ask you now, 
irrespective of your future assignments, to give your actual and 
moral support wherever you encounter our efforts. 
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